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Abstract
There is now an incredible wealth of data about individuals, businesses and orga-
nizations. This data is freely available over the Internet to almost anyone willing to
pay for it, independently of whether they are identity thieves or credit card scam
artists or legitimate users. This has led to a growing need for privacy. In this paper,
we first present a simple logical model of privacy. We then show that the prob-
lem of privacy may be reduced to that of brave reasoning in default logic theories,
thus reducing this important problem to a well understood reasoning paradigm.
By leveraging this reduction, we are able to develop efficient privacy preservation
algorithms
1 Introduction
The privacy of individuals is under attack as never before. In the wake of recent terror-
ist events, various government agencies worldwide are seeking to acquire all kinds of
private information about individuals in an effort to preserve national security. Another
area where potential privacy disasters loom is in the area of medical data - many hospi-
tals post some seemingly innocuous data on web sites (e.g. about births) but it is often
possible to infer private health information about individuals. A third need for privacy
mechanisms is because of poor access control and network security mechanisms that
may allow outsiders to get into supposedly secure networks. In this case, there is a need
to maintain privacy of data even from insiders (both genuine insiders and hackers).
∗This work was supported by the European Commission under projects IST-2002-33570 INFOMIX, IST-
2001-32429 ICONS, and FET-2001-37004 WASP.
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Most databases have abysmal privacy mechanisms - these mechanisms by and large
boil down to saying certain columns of the database are hidden from certain types of
users. However, the reality of life is that many users can infer information designated
private by asking queries that do not involve private information and then making com-
mon sense inferences from the answers to infer private information.
Research on privacy is now rapidly increasing because of the counterterrorism ini-
tiatives as well as because of the increasing availability of financial and health data on
the web.
The primary goal of this paper is to show that there is a close connection between
the problem of providing privacy preserving answers to queries and the problem of
computing extensions of certain kinds of default theories. In particular, we define a
linear time and linear space transformation trans of the privacy preservation problem
to the problem of computing extensions of default logic theories. We prove that there
is a one one correspondence between privacy preserving answers and the extensions
of the default logic theory (restricted to the query) obtained by translating the privacy
preservation problem into default logic via trans. Leveraging this translation, we are
able to derive a suite of results on the complexity of maintaining privacy. Finally, we
present an algorithm to check for privacy.
2 The Privacy Preservation Problem
In this section, we provide a simple formulation of the privacy preservation problem
(P3 for short).
We start by assuming the existence of some finite set U of users. Each member of U
is a string denoting a userid.
We assume the existence of some finite set of constant symbols, function symbols
and predicate symbols. As usual, a term is inductively defined as follows: (i) Each
constant is a term, (ii) Each variable is a term, and (iii) if f is an n-ary predicate symbol
and t1, . . . , tn are terms, then f(t1, . . . , tn) is a term. A ground term is any term that
contains no variable symbols. Similarly, if p is an n-ary predicate symbol and t1, . . . , tn
are terms, then p(t1, . . . , tn) is an atom. A ground atom is any atom that contains no
variable symbols. A well formed formula (wff) is inductively defined as follows. (i)
Every atom is a wff, (ii) If F,G are wffs then so are (F ∧ G), (F ∨ G) and ¬F . We
use WFF to denote the set of all well formed formulas in our language.
Definition 1 (logic database) A logic database LDB is a finite set of ground atoms.
Note that any standard relational database can be viewed as a logic database - if tuple~t
is a tuple in a relation r, then r(~t) is a ground atom.
Example 1 We may have a small medical database containing information about the
symptoms and diseases that a person p may have. Such a database may contain two
predicates symptom and disease. The database may contain the following facts:
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symptom(john, s1) disease(jane, aids)
symptom(john, s2) disease(john, cancer)
symptom(john, s3) disease(ed, polio)
symptom(jane, s1)
symptom(jane, s4)
This little database, which we will call MedDB will be used as a motivating example in
this paper.
The database may contain information about various individuals, businesses and or-
ganizations. These entities may wish to designate some (or all) of this information as
private. For example, John and Jane may want their diseases kept private.
In addition, at any given instance t in time, each user u has some set of background
knowledge. This background knowledge may be elicited in many ways - one such
source is the set of all information disclosed to the user by the system. For example,
a hospital accountant may not be allowed to see patient diagnoses, though he may see
billing information about them.
Definition 2 (user model) We assume the existence of a family of functions BKt : U →
2WFF for each t in time, and a function Priv : U → 2WFF.
As usual, 2X is used here to denote the power set of some set X .
Intuitively, BKt(u) denotes the background knowledge of user u (which we assume
to be consistent) at time t, while Priv(u) is the set of all formulas that the user wants to
keep secret. Note that BKt(u) varies as t varies. For example, as the database discloses
answers to the user u, his background knowledge may increase. Throughout the rest of
this paper, we will assume that t is arbitrary but fixed and we address the problem of
preserving privacy at time t. As a consequence, we will usually write BK(u) and drop
the superscript t.
Example 2 Returning to the case of MedDB, John may want to keep the
atom disease(john, cancer) private, while Jane may want to keep the atom
disease(jane, aids) private. In this case, Priv(john) = {disease(john, cancer)},
while Priv(jane) = {disease(jane, aids)}.
Likewise, consider the user acct (denoting the accountant).
This person may have the following background knowledge.
symptom(X, s1)& symptom(X, s4)→ disease(X, aids)
symptom(X, s2)& symptom(X, s3)→ disease(X, cancer)
Definition 3 (query) If A1, . . . , An are all atoms, then (∃)(A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An) is a query.
For example, disease(john,D) is a query asking what disease D John has.
Definition 4 (answer) The answer, ANS(Q), to query Q w.r.t. a logic database LDB is
the set {Qθ |Qθ is ground and LDB |= Qθ} where, as usual, the symbol “|=” denotes
logical consequence.
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Example 3 Returning to our MedDB example, the answer to the query
disease(john,X) is the set {disease(john, aids)}. Likewise, the answer to the
query symptom(john,X) is the set {symptom(john, s1), symptom(john, s2),
symptom(john, s3)}.
In our example, we considered the case when John and Jane want their diseases
kept private. However, the accountant can violate John’s privacy by asking the
query symptom(john,X). The answer she would get back is {symptom(john, s1),
symptom(john, s2), symptom(john, s3)}. However, recall that the accountant has
some background information - this background information includes the rule
symptom(X, s2)& symptom(X, s3)→ disease(X, cancer). Using this rule and the
answer to her query above, the accountant can easily infer that John has cancer. The
notion of a privacy preserving answer given below is intended to avoid such situations.
Definition 5 (privacy preserving answer) Suppose LDB is a logic database, U is a set
of users, u0 ∈ U , and suppose the functions BK and Priv are specified. Suppose Q is a
query. A set X ⊆ WFF is a privacy preserving answer w.r.t. (LDB,U ,BK,Priv, u0, Q)
iff:
1. X ⊆ ANS(Q) and
2. For all u ∈ U−{u0} and for all p ∈ Priv(u), ifBK(u0) 6|= p thenX ∪BK(u0) 6|=
p and
3. There is no X ′ such that X ⊂ X ′ satisfies the previous two conditions.
Intuitively, a privacy preserving answer to a query posed by user u0 is a subset of the
actual answer to the query that does not allow him to use his background knowledge to
infer any new private information about any other user. Note that when user u0 poses
a query, we are only interested in preserving private information about other users u -
clearly, the user u0 can know private information about himself, as he, presumably, is
the one who decides what information about him is to be kept private.
Example 4 Let us return to the MedDB example, and consider the case of the ob-
noxious accountant. If the system knows that she has the background knowledge listed
earlier, when she asks the query symptom(john,X), then it could return either of the
following privacy preserving answers.
Ans1 = {symptom(john, s1), symptom(john, s2)}
Ans2 = {symptom(john, s1), symptom(john, s3)}
Either of these two answers returns as much of the real answer as possible without
making it possible for the user to infer that John has cancer.
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Let us suppose that the above query was asked at time t. In this case, the accountant’s
background knowledge at time t+1 should be updated so that it includes all his previous
background knowledge, plus the additional knowledge that John has symptoms s1 and
s3. Thus, BKt(acct) = BKt+1(acct) ∪ {symptom(john, s1), symptom(john, s2)}
(assuming the answer returned by the system in response to John’s query at time t is
Ans1 above. For the sake of simplicity, throughout the rest of this paper, we assume that
t is arbitrary but fixed, and that we are only interested in preserving privacy at time t.
Example 5 Suppose now that the system somehow knows that the accountant already
had disease(john, cancer) in his background knowledge at time t (e.g. the system
might know this because a doctor included the accountant on a list of people notified
about John’s health). In this case, revealing the entire answer {symptom(john, s1),
symptom(john, s2), symptom(john, s3)} to the query symptom(john,X) to the ac-
countant would not violate John’s privacy as the answer does not allow the accountant
to infer any private facts that he did not already know. As a consequence, were the
accountant’s background knowledge to include the rules mentioned earlier and the ad-
ditional fact disease(john, cancer), then there is only one privacy preserving answer,
viz. {symptom(john, s1), symptom(john, s2), symptom(john, s3)}.
We emphasize that the above definition allows the background knowledge to contain
some private information. A simpler definition would be to drop the “if BK(u0) 6|= p
then” part in (2) above. But then there would be no privacy preserving answers at all
if BK(u0) contained some private information. We are now ready to state the Privacy
Preservation Problem (P3).
Problem 1 (P3(LDB,U ,BK,Priv, u0, Q)) Suppose LDB is a logic database, U is a fi-
nite set of users, BK is a background knowledge function, Priv is a privacy function, u0
is a user in U who is posing query Q to the logic database LDB. The privacy preserva-
tion problem is to find a privacy-preserving answer w.r.t. (LDB,U ,BK,Priv, u0, Q).
The following proposition says that there is always a privacy preserving answer.
Proposition 1 Every privacy preservation problem P3(LDB,U ,BK,Priv, u0, Q) has
at least one privacy preservation answer.
A database system that seeks to preserve privacy can use the following algorithm to
answer queries posed by user u0.
algorithm PrivAns(P3(LDB,U ,BK,Priv, u0, Q))
1. Find a privacy preserving answer Ans to query Q w.r.t.
(LDB,U ,BK,Priv, u0, Q).
2. Update BK(u0) = BK(u0),∪Ans.
3. Return Ans to user u0 and halt.
The key step in this algorithm is step (1). The rest of this paper develops methods to
implement step (1).
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3 Translating the PP Problem to Default Logic
In this section, we provide a translation trans which takes as input, a privacy preserva-
tion problem P3(LDB,U ,BK,Priv, u0, Q), and returns as output, a default logic theory
∆ = (D,W ) such that there is a one one correspondence between the solutions to the
privacy preservation problem and the extensions of the default theory (restricted to the
query) returned by the translation [Cadoli et al., 1997]. The consequence of this trans-
lation is that standard (and well studied) methods to evaluate default logic theories may
be used to preserve privacy effectively, efficiently, and elegantly.
Definition 6 (translation trans) Let P3(LDB, .U ,BK,Priv, u0, Q) be a privacy
preservation problem. The translation, trans(LDB,U ,BK,Priv, u0, Q) of a privacy
preservation problem into default logic is the default logic theory ∆ = (D,W ) where:
W = BK(u0).
D = { : f
f
| f ∈ LDB}
⋃
{p :¬p | (∃u ∈ U − {u0}) p ∈ Priv(u)
and BK(u0) 6|= p}.
We now present an example to show what the result of transforming the privacy preser-
vation problem into default logic looks like.
Example 6 Let us return to the case of the accountant. In this case, W consists of the
two rules
symptom(X, s1)& symptom(X, s4)→ disease(X, aids)
symptom(X, s2)& symptom(X, s3)→ disease(X, cancer). In addition, D
consists of the following defaults:
: symptom(john,s1)
symptom(john,s1)
: disease(jane,aids)
disease(jane,aids)
: symptom(john,s2)
symptom(john,s2)
: disease(john,cancer)
disease(john,cancer)
: symptom(john,s3)
symptom(john,s3)
: disease(ed,polio)
disease(ed,polio)
: symptom(jane,s1)
symptom(jane,s1)
: symptom(jane,s4)
symptom(jane,s4)
disease(jane,aids) :
¬disease(jane,aids)
disease(john,cancer) :
¬disease(john,cancer)
Note that we are assuming here that Ed has not marked his disease as being a private
fact.
Note that this translation uses linear space. The time complexity of the translation de-
pends on the complexity of checking entailment. For example, assuming a finite number
of constants in our language (reasonable) and assuming that all rules in BK are definite
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clauses, then the translation is implementable in polynomial time. But if BK can consist
of arbitrary first order formulas, then the translation can take exponential time.
Before presenting our central theorem linking privacy preserving answers and exten-
sions of default theories, we remind the reader of some basic terminology associated
with default theories. Given a default d = α:βγ , we use the notation pre(d) to de-
note α, j(d) to denote β and c(d) to denote γ. In addition, given any default theory
∆ = (D,W ), we may associate with ∆, a mapping Γ∆ which maps sets of wffs to sets
of wffs. Γ∆(Y ) = CN(W ∪ {pre(d) → c(d) | j(d) is consistent with Y }. As usual,
the function CN(X) denotes the set of all first order logical consequences of X . A set
Y of wffs is an extension of ∆ iff Y = Γ∆(Y ).
We are now ready to present a key result linking the privacy preservation problem
and default logic extensions. Suppose we consider any privacy preservation problem.
The privacy preserving answers to that privacy preservation problem are in a one-one
correspondence with the consistent extensions of the translation (restricted to the query)
of the privacy preservation problem into default logic (using the translation trans shown
in Definition 6).
Theorem 7 Suppose that A is an atom and that P3(LDB,U ,BK,Priv, u0, A) is a pri-
vacy preservation problem and trans(LDB,U ,BK,Priv, u0, A) = ∆ = (D,W ). Then:
X is a solution to the above privacy preservation problem iff there is a consistent ex-
tension E of ∆ = (D,W ) such that X = {Aθ |Aθ ∈ E ∩ LDB}.
Proof. We first formulate a useful abstract lemma.
Lemma 8 Let W , LDB and P be consistent sets of formulae s.t. W ∪LDB is consis-
tent as well. Let DP = {p :¬p : p ∈ P} and DLDB = { : ff : f ∈ LDB}.
Then the consistent extensions of the theory (DP ∪DLDB ,W ) are the sets Cn(W ∪
{f : f ∈ F}) where F is a subset of LDB that is maximal wrt. set inclusion (i.e. there
is no larger set F ′ such that W ∪ {f : f ∈ F ′} 6|= p for all p ∈ P ).
The proof of our main theorem is an application of our lemma. Suppose X is
a solution to P3(LDB,U ,BK,Priv, u0, A) and let trans(LDB,U ,BK,Priv, u0, A) =
∆ = (D,W ). Then we let F := X , W := BK(u0) and P := {p : (∃u ∈ U − {u0})
p ∈ Priv(u) and BK(u0) 6|= p} and apply our lemma. The set Cn(W ∪ {f : f ∈ F})
is an extension (it is maximal because of (3) and (2) in the definition of a privacy pre-
serving answer).
Conversely let be given a consistent extension E of trans(LDB,U ,BK,Priv, u0, A)
and consider X := {Aθ | Aθ ∈ E ∩ LDB}. Our lemma implies that X is a subset of
LDB that is maximal. Therefore X is also a privacy preserving answer (if there were
a larger X ′ satisfying (2) in the definition of pp answer, then E would not be maximal
and thus not be an extension).
Proof of the lemma. Clearly the sets Cn(W ∪ {f : f ∈ F}) where F is a maximal
subset of LDB are extensions of the default theory: the defaults in DP do not apply
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and we are left with a supernormal default theory (the result follows from well-known
characterizations in default logic, see eg. [Dix, 1992, Marek and Truszczyn´ski, 1993]).
Conversely, let E be a consistent extension. Then no default in DP applies. Because
extensions are grounded and we are dealing with a supernormal theory, E must have
the form Cn(W ∪ {f : f ∈ F}) for a subset F of LDB. Because E is maximal (no
other extension can contain E), the set Cn(W ∪ {f : f ∈ F}) is maximal in the sense
defined in the lemma.
The preceding theorem applies to atomic queries. A straightforward extension of the
above proof gives us the following theorem which applies to arbitrary queries.
Corollary 1 Suppose that P3(LDB,U ,BK,Priv, u0, Q) is a privacy preservation prob-
lem and that trans(LDB,U ,BK,Priv, u0, Q) = ∆ = (D,W ). Then: X is a solution
to the above privacy preservation problem iff there is a consistent extension E of
∆ = (D,W ) such that X = {Qθ |Qθ ∈ E ∩ LDB}.
In order to illustrate this theorem, we revisit the example privacy preservation prob-
lem and its default logic translation that we presented earlier.
Example 9 Let us return to the MedDB example. Consider the privacy preservation
problem of Example 4 and the default logic translation shown in Figure 6. As seen in
Example 4, there are two privacy preserving answers to this problem. They are:
Ans1 = {symptom(john, s1), symptom(john, s2)}
Ans2 = {symptom(john, s1), symptom(john, s3)}.
The default logic translation of this privacy preservation problem shown in Example 6
has exactly four consistent extensions E1, . . . , E4.
E1 = CN(W ∪ {symptom(john, s1), symptom(john, s2),
symptom(jane, s1), disease(ed, polio)}).
E2 = CN(W ∪ {symptom(john, s1), symptom(john, s3),
symptom(jane, s1), disease(ed, polio)}).
E3 = CN(W ∪ {symptom(john, s1), symptom(john, s2),
symptom(jane, s4), disease(ed, polio)}).
E4 = CN(W ∪ {symptom(john, s1), symptom(john, s3),
symptom(jane, s4), disease(ed, polio)}).
However, if we restrict our interest to answers to the query
symptom(john,X) in the above extensions, then extensions E1, E4 only con-
tain {symptom(john, s1), symptom(john, s2)} while E2, E3 only contain
{symptom(john, s1), symptom(john, s3)}. These restrictions of the extensions
are in a one-one correspondence with the privacy preserving answers to the query
posed by the accountant.
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4 Complexity of Privacy Preservation
In this section, we analyze the complexity of the privacy preservation problem.
Computing a privacy-preserving answer typically involves “guessing” a subset of an-
swers, and subsequently checking it with respect to privacy preservation and maximal-
ity. Intuitively, this computational task has a correspondence to common non-monotonic
reasoning tasks, because the maximality condition for privacy-preserving answers has
its counterpart as minimality conditions in non-monotonic semantics, while guessing a
model candidate and checking it on a set of formulae is even more closely related.
It therefore does not come as a surprise that a non-monotonic logic allows for an apt
representation of the privacy preservation problem. Concerning the complexity analy-
sis, we can indeed leverage the translation trans to use well-known results concerning
the complexity of default logic in order to prove membership of various subclasses of
P3.
As already shown in [Reiter, 1980], default reasoning involving function symbols
is undecidable. Note that Definitions 5 and 6 involve checking BK(u0) 6|= p, which
is clearly undecidable for arbitrary first-order formulae. We will therefore focus on
decidable fragments. In particular, we will assume in our analyses below that problems
are restricted to those for which deciding BK 6|= p, p ∈ Priv is feasible in polynomial
time. We will focus on theories in a Datalog setting, the data complexity of which
corresponds to propositional default theories.
Then, membership can be seen by virtue of trans and the shape of formulae in
BK and Priv. In particular, brave reasoning for non-disjunctive default theories is NP-
complete (see e.g. [Kautz and Selman, 1991, Stillman, 1990] for such classes), while
brave reasoning for arbitrary default theories is ΣP2 -complete, see [Gottlob, 1992] and
[Stillman, 1992].
We thus consider P3s with the following restrictions:
1. We vary BK(u) to be an arbitrary theory, a non-disjunctive theory, and a set of
facts.
2. We vary Priv(u) to be a set of arbitrary formulas, a non-disjunctive theory, and a
set of facts.
Table 1 summarizes our results on the complexity of privacy preservation in the
Datalog case.
Theorem 10 The data complexity for P3 problems without function symbols under var-
ious syntactic restrictions are as reported in Table 1. Completeness holds for NP and
ΣP2 results.
Next, we will prove some of the hardness results.
Corollary 2 P3 with BK containing non-disjunctive rules and Priv made of facts is
hard for NP.
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Priv/BK Facts Non-disjunctive Arbitrary
Facts P P ΣP2
Non-disjunctive NP NP ΣP2
Arbitrary ΣP2 Σ
P
2 Σ
P
2
Table 1: Data Complexity of Privacy Preservation Problems
Proof. We show NP-hardness by a reduction from 3SAT to a P3 in which BK con-
tains only rules with negation on LDB predicates and in which Priv contains only one
fact: Given a CNF φ =
∧n
i=1 Li,1 ∨ Li,2 ∨ Li,3, we create a P3 with LDB = {ci |
ci is an atom in φ} ∪ {q}, two users u0, u1, BK(u0) = {L′i,1 ∧ L′i,2 ∧ L′i,3 → unsat},
where (¬x)′ = x and x′ = ¬x. Finally, Priv(u1) = {unsat}, and Q = q. It is not
hard to see that q is an answer iff φ is satisfiable: If q is an answer, then a truth as-
signment can be obtained from the subset X ⊆ LDB in which exactly the ci in X are
interpreted as true. Since unsat does not hold for this X , no conjunct in φ evaluates to
false under this assignment, which therefore satisfies φ. Conversely, if φ is satisfiable,
each cardinality maximal satisfying truth assignment induces an X ⊆ LDB, such that
X ∪BK(u0) 6|= unsat.
Corollary 3 P3 with empty BK and arbitrary Priv is hard for ΣP2 .
Proof. We show ΣP2 -hardness by a reduction from a QBF2,∃ to a P3 in which BK is
empty and Priv contains arbitrary formulae. Consider ψ = ∃x1 · · · ∃xn∀y1 · · · ∀ymφ,
where φ is a propositional formula. We create a P3 with LDB = {x1, . . . , xn} ∪ {q},
two users u0, u1, Priv(u1) = {¬E}, and Q = q. An answer X induces a valuation ν
of the existentially quantified variables. Then, no extension ν′ of ν to the universally
quantified variables can exist such that E is false, hence ψ is valid. Conversely, if ψ is
valid, each cardinality maximal satisfying truth assignment for x1, . . . , xn induces an
answer.
This proof can easily be adapted such that BK(u0) contains the arbitrary formula
(¬E)→ unsat and Priv(u1) contains only unsat.
All complexity results above refer to propositional theories or data complexity, in
our setting this means that only LDB is considered as input, while especially BK and
Priv are considered to be fixed. For considering program complexity, we can adapt the
data complexity results by using techniques from [Gottlob et al., 1999]. Due to space
constraints, we do not present proofs.
Theorem 11 The program complexity for P3 problems without function symbols under
various syntactic restrictions are as reported in the table below.
Priv/BK Facts Non-disj. Arbitrary
Facts EXPTIME EXPTIME NEXPTIMENP
Non-disj. NEXPTIME NEXPTIME NEXPTIMENP
Arbitrary NEXPTIMENP NEXPTIMENP NEXPTIMENP
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To summarize, the results in this section confirm that default logic is indeed a suitable
choice to represent P3s.
5 Privacy Preservation Algorithm
In this section, we describe an algorithm to preserve privacy that leverages our transla-
tion of the privacy preservation problem to default logic. First and foremost, we recall
the important observation of [Baral and Subrahmanian, 1993] that Reiter’s Γ∆ operator
is anti-monotonic - hence, the operator Γ2∆ that applies Γ∆ is monotonic. As a con-
sequence, Γ2∆ has both a least fixpoint and a greatest fixpoint, denoted lfp(Γ
2
∆) and
gfp(Γ2∆) respectively.
Theorem 12 ([Baral and Subrahmanian, 1993]) Recall the following properties:
1. If Y1 ⊆ Y2 then Γ∆(Y2) ⊆ Γ∆(Y1).
2. Γ2∆ has a least and a greatest fixpoint, denoted respectively as lfp(Γ
2
∆) and
gfp(Γ2∆).
3. Γ∆(lfp(Γ2∆)) = gfp(Γ
2
∆).
An immediate consequence of the above theorem is that one can compute extensions of
default theories by first computing lfp(Γ2∆) and gfp(Γ
2
∆). Anything in lfp(Γ
2
∆) is true in
all extensions, while anything not in gfp(Γ2∆) is false in all extensions. We can therefore
start by computing both lfp(Γ2∆) and gfp(Γ
2
∆). If lfp(Γ
2
∆) is not an extension, we non-
deterministically add things in gfp(Γ2∆) to the default theory and iteratively compute
the least fixpoint of Γ2∆ w.r.t. the modified theory. This algorithm for arbitrary default
theories gives rise to the following specialization for computing privacy preserving an-
swers.
P3Alg(LDB,U ,BK,Priv, u0, Q)
∆ = trans(LDB,U ,BK,Priv, u0, Q) = (D,W );
Todo = LDB ∩ (gfp(Γ2∆) \ lfp(Γ2∆));
if lfp(Γ2∆) = Γ∆(lfp(Γ2∆)) then
done = true;
while Todo 6= ∅ ∧ ¬done do
Nondeterministically select an a ∈ Todo;
Let ∆ = (D,W ∪ {a});
if lfp(Γ2∆) = Γ∆(lfp(Γ2∆)) then
done = true;
else
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Todo = Todo \ {a};
% end-while
return LDB ∩ lfp(Γ2∆);
The algorithm proceeds as follows: First the problem is translated to a default theory
using trans. Subsequently, the least and greatest fixpoint of Γ2∆ are computed. Anything
which is in the greatest, but not in the least fixpoint can or cannot be true in some
extension, so we store it in Todo to nondeterministically assume its truth.
The crucial point here is that we restrict these nondeterministic choices to LDB,
which can dramatically decrease the search space. Then we enter the nondeterministic
phase of the algorithm, in which a truth assignment for Todo is generated until a fixpoint
(i.e., an extension) is reached, if at all. As a final step, a projection of the extension onto
LDBis generated.
The following theorem states that the above algorithm is always guaranteed to return
the correct answer.
Theorem 13 Consider a privacy preservation problem P3(LDB,U ,BK,Priv, u0, Q).
Then the algorithm P3Alg(LDB,U ,BK,Priv, u0, Q) returns X iff X is a privacy pre-
serving answer to P3(LDB,U ,BK,Priv, u0, Q).
We have thus given an effective and also efficient (w.r.t. to general algorithms com-
puting answers to default theories) algorithm for computing privacy preserving answers.
6 Related Work and Conclusions
Security and privacy of information are closely related. There
has been extensive work on privacy and security for many years
now [M. Winslett and Qian, 1994, P. Bonatti and Subrahmanian, 1995,
Cuppens and Demolombe, 1997, Samarati and Sweeney, 1998]. A body of work
in the field [M. Winslett and Qian, 1994, P. Bonatti and Subrahmanian, 1995] set up
the security problem as that of inferring a maximal subset of the answer to a query
so that no secrets are violated. Algorithms were also given to determine how to
update the database so that security and privacy are preserved. Another body of work
[Samarati and Sweeney, 1998] determines how to generalize answers (rather than
choose a subset). Our work is related to the former category.
In contrast to the above body of work, we are aware of no works that ties well known
nonmonotonic logic formalisms such as default logic to the privacy preservation prob-
lem. This paper is a first step in this regard. As shown by the P3Alg algorithm and the
complexity results derived in this paper, the relationships between privacy preservation
and default logics can lead to results in one domain being applicable and beneficial to
another. Our future work will focus on leveraging the relationship between default logic
and privacy even further so that the rich experience gained in implementing default log-
ics can be applied fruitfully to the privacy domain.
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